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1 Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the interplay between a facility-based vertically 
integrated firm and an independent competitor in the retail market for broadband Internet 
connectivity. The latter firm buys local access as an input from the former firm. The vertically 
integrated firm undertakes an investment (broadband upgrades) that increases the quality of 
the input. We assume that the regulator has only one instrument available, an access price 
regulation for the input sold to the independent rival. 1  The retail market is assumed to be 
unregulated.2 Furthermore, we assume that the access price is set after the investment but 
prior to retail market competition since the regulator has limited commitment ability. Both the 
timing structure and the one-sided regulation of the input segment correspond to the dominant 
regulatory paradigm in the EU and the USA (Laffont and Tirole, 2000, Hausman, 1997, and 
Cave and Prosperetti, 2001). Installation of fiber in the local access network will be a 
substantial, lumpy, and irreversible investment, and the economic life of the investment will 
be longer than the regulation contract used for access prices (Hausman, 1997).3 
The access price regulation may reduce investment incentives, and the main message of this 
paper is that the total welfare effect of access price regulation critically depends on which 
firm has the highest ability to transform input to output. The quality of the input component 
sold from the integrated firm is the same for both retailers, but the retailers may differ in their 
ability to offer value-added services (broadband services such as interactive video).4 Except 
for the case where the independent firm has the highest ability to use the improved input 
quality, the integrated firm will foreclose the rival from the market through the access price in 
an unregulated environment. However, this is not a sufficient condition to ensure that an 
access price regulation improves consumer surplus and total welfare. If the retailers do not 
differ too much with respect to their ability to offer value-added services when the input 
                                                                 
1 See Laffont and Tirole (2000) and Armstrong (2001) for comprehensive overviews of access price theory and 
practice. Cave and Mason (2001) give an extensive overview of the market structure and regulation in the 
Internet. 
2 See Laffont and Tirole (2000) for a discussion.   
3 Price cap regulations in telecommunication do not exceed five years, and other types of access price regulation 
are usually set for a shorter period. In contrast to the present paper, the literature on price caps typically focuses 
on incentives for cost-reducing activities within the regulatory contract.  
4 The independent firm may be anything from the geeks in the garage to AOL Time Warner. Co mpared to the 
facility-based vertically integrated firm, those firms’ ability to offer value-added services will obviously vary a 
lot. The integrated firm’s retailer may have an advantage in using the improved input quality due to economies 
of scope from integration. In contrast, if the independent retailer is a firm like AOL Time Warner, it may have an 
advantage compared to the integrated firm due to its experience from other markets.  
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quality is improved, we show that access price regulation reduces the vertically integrated 
firm’s investment incentives. An access price regulation lowers consumer surplus and total 
welfare as long as the cost of investment is not too convex. If the vertically integrated firm’s 
ability to offer value-added services is much higher than the independent rival, an increase in 
the investment will reduce the quantity offered by the independent retailer. An access price 
regulation still eliminates the vertically integrated firm’s ability to use the access price as a 
foreclosure tool, but now the integrated firm may use overinvestment as an alternative tool to 
drive the rival out of the market.  
Today the majority of residential consumers use their telephone lines for the last mile of 
narrowband Internet connectivity, and by upgrading their local networks the 
telecommunication providers are able to increase the speed of communication. 5 The high up-
front investments of new wire line facilities, and the possibility of increasing the capacity and 
quality of existing local telephony and cable-tv networks, indicate that telephone companies 
and the cable-tv-companies that already have installed wires to homes, will control the 
segment for broadband local access to residential consumers (Mackie-Mason, 1999).6 In the 
current regulation only the telephone access provider is mandated to supply local access as an 
input to non-facility based rivals in the retail market. Therefore, the telephony incumbent has 
been the only provider of local access as an input to independent ISPs7. Hence, given the 
existing asymmetry in regulation of the telecommunication and the cable-tv technologies (see 
Hausman et al., 2001), the present model only fits for services offered by the 
telecommunication incumbents.8  
                                                                 
5 Measured by bits per second (bps). A conventional voice telephone call needs approximately 10 kilo-bps. The 
bandwidth requirement for broadband services will vary a lot, and it also varies between incoming and outgoing 
capacity.  Compression technologies may reduce the bandwidth requirements considerably, but in order to 
support e.g. two interactive high-quality tv channels several mega-bps are needed.  Current standard modem 
technology gives access speed of 56 kbps. In Europe, however, the penetration of ISDN is higher. ISDN access 
speed is no more than 128kbps. The upgrading technologies both for cable-tv and telephone lines should give 
access speed from a few hundred kbps to 10-20 mbps.   
6 With focus on the US market several analysts have argued that the cable-tv-providers have an advantage over 
the local telephone providers in supplying broadband Internet access (see e.g. Mackie-Mason, 1999, and 
Faulhaber and Hogendorn, 2000). The situation seems to be different in Europe (Roche et al., 2001). There may 
be several reasons for this difference. First, there is high penetration of cable-tv in the US compared to many 
European countries. Second, and probably more important, the historical separation between local providers and 
long distance providers of telephony in the US between 1984 and 1996 (the AT&T break-up in 1984).  
7 Internet Service Providers. 
8 However, since the cable-tv providers face an analogous cost structure, the analysis will be relevant for 
broadband access using cable-tv technology if the cable-tv providers are required to offer broadband access as a 
wholesale product.   
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We assume that the investment in higher speed of communication may be seen as an 
unambiguous improvement of quality.9 The closer to homes the fiber is installed, the higher is 
the quality. 10 The trade-off between the distance the existing lines are used and the network 
quality (speed) implies that the upgrading costs are convex in speed of communication. 
In figure 1 we illustrate the Internet as a layered network with the physical network as the 
bottom layer. Local access is obviously an essential input component for the ISPs. The 
functions of the retail ISPs are to combine the components’ local access, regional backbone 
capacity and global backbone capacity, and they act as a kind of portal to the applications and 
content in the Internet.  
 
 
Local access Regional backbones  Global backbones  
Protocols for distribution of data 
Applications and content   
 
Figure 1: The layered structure of the Internet. 
As described by Cave and Mason (2001) and Faulhaber and Hogendorn (2000), the retail ISPs 
must choose their regional and global backbone capacity before they serve the end users. This 
implies capacity constraints that limit the number of consumers that can be served.11 With 
respect to timing in our model it is reasonable to assume that the investment choice of speed 
of communication in the access network is taken prior to the ISPs’ choice of local and global 
                                                                 
9 First, an increase in speed of communication gives access to new broadband services (e.g. interactive audio and 
video). Second, consumers’ value from conventional Internet services like web-browsing and e-mail increases 
when the downloading speed increases. Third, today’s dial-up Internet connectivity is only connected when the 
user makes a phone call to her Internet Service Provider (ISP). The broadband Internet connectivity systems are 
designed to be available all the time (“always on”).  
10 There may be horizontal differentiation in this market (see Foros and Hansen, 2001). However, we make this 
assumption in order to strengthen the foreclosure incentives of the vertically integrated firm in absence of access 
price regulation. 
11 Although the total number of retail ISPs is large, the market is quite concentrated since the largest providers 
are controlling a large part of the market. Cave and Mason (2001) argue that the current narrowband dial-up 
access limits the economies of scale in the ISP-segment. In the ISPs’ local backbones the subscribers’ traffic is 
combined and carried over shared lines, and the ISPs use statistical aggregation in order to reduce the investment 
in capacity. However, the capacity limits in the narrowband access are constraining the economies of scale from 
traffic aggregation. The situation will be different with broadband access technologies, and this will probably 
also increase the concentration in the ISP-segment (Cave and Mason, 2001). The regional ISPs usually have 
long-term contracts with the providers of transatlantic-lines and access to the core global backbones (Crémer, 
Rey and Tirole, 2000). To some extent, this will also give capacity constraints in the end-user market. 
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backbone capacity. The interplay between local retail ISPs and the upstream providers of 
global access will not be addressed in the present paper. 
Our paper is related to the literature on strategic R&D investments with spillovers.12 In 
contrast to our model, there is no opportunity for access pricing by the investing firms in this 
literature. The literature on R&D investments assumes that the investment leads to a reduction 
in costs, and that there is a spillover that also reduces rivals costs.13 
Rey and Tirole (1997) analyse the incentives for foreclosure by a vertically integrated firm 
that controls an input bottleneck in an unregulated market, while Laffont and Tirole (2000) 
discuss the incentives for non-price discrimination under access price regulation. Several 
recent papers analyse non-price foreclosure in telecommunications and the Internet. Similar to 
Economides (1998) we assume an exogeneously given market structure where an integrated 
firm controls the input-segment, and there is an unregulated Cournot duopol in the retail 
segment. Economides (1998) shows that the integrated firm will always use non-price 
foreclosure towards the retail rival. This result contrasts with Weisman (1995, 1998),  Sibley 
and Weisman (1998), Weisman and Kang (2001) and Foros, Kind and Sørgard (2002), who 
find that that the vertically integrated firm will be less inclined to degrade the quality of the 
input if the profit margin is high in the input segment. In all these papers the foreclosure 
activity is assumed to degrade the quality of the input sold to the rivals. In contrast, in our 
model there is no opportunity to unilaterally reduce the quality of the input sold to the rival. 
The quality level of the input is the same for both retailers. However, if the vertically 
integrated firm has significantly higher ability to offer value-added services than the rival, the 
integrated firm may commit itself to be more aggressive in the retail market by overinvesting 
in network quality improvement.  
Faulhaber and Hogendorn (2000) and Foros and Kind (2002) analyse the broadband access 
market with focus on the choice of target market (where to upgrade to broadband), while the 
coverage decision is not analysed in the present paper.  Another distinction from the present 
                                                                 
12 Spence (1984) models spillovers from the investment, but he assumes that the firms are symmetric in their 
ability to invest. The seminal paper on strategic R&D-investments and spillovers is D’Aspremont and Jacquemin 
(1988). 
13 Investments that create positive demand side effects are not considered in this literature. Our formulation of 
the demand side spillover is analogous to Wey (1999), who examines symmetric firms’ incentives to invest in 
compatibility under different degrees of co-operation. Note that the investment in network quality in the present 
paper may be equivalent to Katz and Shapiro (1985) who see the network quality as the number of expected 
consumers (see discussion below).  
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paper is that these two papers develop models of competition among several facility-based 
broadband access providers, while we analyse the interplay between a facility-based provider 
and a non-facility-based rival. Hausman, Sidak, and Singer (2001) analyse the asymmetric 
regulation of telecommunication providers and cable-tv providers regarding broadband 
access. Rubinfeld and Singer (2001) analyse the merged AOL Time Warner’s incentive to 
engage into two types of non-price foreclosure in the broadband access market.14  
The article is organised as follows. In section 2 we present the model. In section 3 we give 
some concluding remarks.  
2 The model 
In figure 2 we illustrate the stylised market structure analysed in the present paper. In the 
retail market for Internet connectivity there is competition between a vertically integrated 
firm’s subsidiary and an independent ISP, ISP A and ISP B, respectively. The vertically 
integrated firm controls the local access component. The broadband Internet connectivity is 
sold by the two ISPs to end-users at a fixed subscription fee independent of actual usage (the 
number of packets actually sent and received) and time connected. This also corresponds with 
what we see in the market place for broadband Internet connectivity. 15 Hence, the ISPs face a 
downward sloping demand curve. When the subscription fee is reduced (for given quality), 
more consumers will subscribe. The usage by the infra-marginal consumers is, however, not 
affected.16 The access input price charged by the facility-based firm will be a fee for each 
broadband subscriber served by the rival ISP (ISP B) over the vertical integrated firm’s local 
network facilities.  
                                                                 
14 Rubinfeld and Singer (2001) show that AOL Time Warner has both the ability and incentive to engage into 
non-price foreclosure. In contrast to our model, they do not consider investment incentives and access pricing, 
and they assume that the foreclosure activity will reduce the quality of the component offered to the rival.  
15 This is in contrast to the current narrowband Internet connectivity through modem where the user pays a time-
dependent price while he is connected. However, the current billing systems do not charge the users for their 
actual usage of bandwidth. 
16 Thus, we implicitly assume that the direct network effects are insignificant. In other words, for a given speed 
of communication in the local loop, the willingness to pay is not affected by the number of consumers 
subscribing to broadband in the same area. This assumption seems realistic if the user is mostly downloading 
information from the US. However, if the user’s main use of broadband Internet connectivity is to have video-
conferences with neighbours this assumption is rarely fulfilled.  
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Figure 2: The market structure 
 
When the network quality is improved, the demand curves for both retailers shift outwards, 
such that the willingness to pay for subscription increases for all potential consumers. If the 
firms differ in their ability to use the quality improvement of the input, the market shares of 
the firms will be affected. 
We model a three-stage game with the following timing structure:  
· Stage 0: The vertically integrated firm chooses the investment level x. 
· Stage 1: The vertically integrated firm or the regulator chooses the access price w to the 
rival. 
· Stage 2: The two retail firms compete à la Cournot. 
As mentioned above, we focus on how “fat” pipes to homes the vertically integrated firm 
chooses, and we do not consider the choice of target market (where to upgrade to broadband). 
Faulhaber and Hogendorn (2000) and Foros and Kind (2002) analyse the choice of target 
market for a given quality level. The choice of coverage may in fact be set street-by-street, 
and therefore be taken after the investment choice considered here. However, as long as the 
integrated firm is obligated to offer broadband access as a wholesale product to the 
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independent ISP in the entire target market, this will not alter the aspects analysed in the 
present paper.17  
We assume Cournot competition in the retail market, and the quantity firms dump in the retail 
market is interpreted as the number of subscriptions they sell. An assumption of Cournot 
competition seems reasonable, since the retailers face capacity constraints in the regional and 
the global backbones (see above and the discussion by Faulhaber and Hogendorn (2000) and 
Crémer et al. (2000)).18   
Demand side 
The investment at stage 0 is given by x. We see this investment as a quality improvement of 
the local access input that increases the consumers’ willingness to pay for broadband Internet 
connectivity.  How much the input quality improvement increases consumers’ willingness to 
pay for Internet connectivity depends on the retail firms’ ability to transform input to output. 
Hence, we have a demand side spillover from the local access provider to the retailers:  
a a x1 1= + b  and a a x2 2= + b  
Subscript 1 and 2 indicate the facility-based and the non-facility-based firm, respectively. The 
parameters b1  and b 2 are the demand side spillover from the facility-based firm to its own 
subsidiary and the independent ISP, respectively.19 If b b1 2> , the vertically integrated firm 
has higher ability to offer a value-added service from the investment than the non-facility 
                                                                 
17 However, an obligation to offer the input in the entire target market combined with an access price regulation 
will probably reduce the coverage where the integrated firm chooses to upgrade to broadband. The reason for 
this is that it reduces the revenue, but not the costs from serving a given region.   
18 Faulhaber and Hogendorn (2000) assume that there is a capacity-constrained price game in the retail market 
for broadband access, and that the conditions for the Kreps-Scheinkman result are fulfilled in their model. They 
model a three-stage game where the coverage decision is taken in stage 1, stage 2 is the backbone capacity 
choice, and in stage 3 firms choose prices. Hence, the investment choice analysed in the present paper may be 
seen as a stage prior to the model analysed by Faulhaber and Hogendorn. The two last stages of their game are 
shown to be equivalent to a one-stage Cournot game. The result of Kreps and Sheinkman (1983) that a two -stage 
game of capacity choice and then prices is the same as a one-stage Cournot game rests on very strong 
assumptions.  However, since there are rigid capacity constraints we assume that the Cournot competition 
assumption seems more realistic than a Bertrand game in the retail market (see the discussion in Tirole, 1988, 
chapter 5). A necessary condition to ensure the Kreps-Scheinkman conditions in our context is that the ISPs 
simultaneously set the backbone capacity in a stage 2a, and that they thereafter compete in prices in a stage 2b.  
19 The spillover is analogous to the spillover effect from R&D investment in D’Aspremont and Jacquemin 
(1988), among others. They assume process innovation, while we assume product innovation.  
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based firm. In contrast, if b b2 1> , the non-facility based firm has the highest ability to 
increase consumers’ willingness to pay. We assume that b b1 2 0 1, ,Î . 
The consumers have unit demands. We assume that the consumers are heterogenous in their 
basic willingness to pay for Internet connectivity, but that they are homogenous in their 
valuation of the improved network quality. Hence, consumers valuation of ISP i’s service is s 
+ xib , and s is distributed uniformly among the consumers. The consumer with the highest 
willingness to pay has s equal to a. The demand structure is analogous to Katz and Shapiro 
(1985) where the network quality depends on the number of expected consumers connected to 
firm i.20  
When ip  is the price charged by ISP i, a consumer of type s buys from ISP i if s + ii px -b > 
s + jj px -b  (where  ji ¹ ). If s + ii px -b <0 for both retailers, the consumer of type s will 
not buy from any of them.  
Thus, the inverse demand functions faced by the firms are: 
p a q q
p a q q
1 1 1 2
2 2 1 2
= - -
= - -
 
Note that the parameters x1b and x2b  do not affect the slope of the inverse demand 
functions, so that an increase in x implies parallel shifts in the demand functions. If  b b2 1¹ , 
there will be different magnitudes in the demand shifts.  
Total production is Q q q= +1 2  and net consumer surplus is: 
 2
22
1
11
22
q
pa
q
pa
CS
-
+
-
=  
In absence of the investment we assume that the services offered by the firms are identical. 
For the existing network quality (absence of the investment), the ISPs offer access to 
conventional PC-centric services like www and e-mail. For these services there exist known 
                                                                 
20 In the Katz and Shapiro-model consumers value service i at )( eiqvs + , where 
e
iq  is the consumers’ 
expectations of the size of firm i’s network.  
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and accepted standards, but the situation may change when new technology is implemented.21 
When the access network quality is upgraded, the ISPs may offer new TV-centric interactive 
broadband services that are very different from conventional PC-centric services. Then, there 
may be differences in their ability to offer such services due to economies of scope from 
integration and/or different experience. As long as b1  = b 2 the end user services from the two 
ISPs will be identical also when the investment is positive (x>0). Then the investment 
increases the quality level of the retailers’ end-user services by the same level. In contrast, if 
ji bb > , then there will be a quality differential between the two retailers’ services, and ISP i 
will offer a higher quality than ISP j (where i, j=1,2).  
Supply side 
Regarding the vertical integrated firm’s cost structure in the upstream segment for local 
access, we assume that cost per user is a constant marginal cost c. This cost is the same 
irrespective of whether its own downstream subsidiary or the rival is serving the end-user. We 
assume that the infrastructure quality, i.e. the investment level, does not have any effect on 
the marginal cost c. The facility-based firm faces a quadratic network investment cost with 
respect to investment in higher speed (bandwidth) in the local loop, given by C x x1
2 2( ) /= j .  
The investment cost x is not related to each user; the investment is for every potential user. 
For simplicity, the marginal costs of buying all other inputs than local access (regional and 
global backbone capacity) are assumed to be the same for the two retailers, and normalised to 
zero. 
The profit functions for the firms are given by: 
p j1 1 1 2
2 2= - + - -( ) ( ) /p c q w c q x  
p 2 2 2= -( )p w q  
The vertically integrated firm is active in both the upstream and the retail segment, while the 
non-facility based firm earns profit only in the retail segment. The parameter w is the access 
price charged by the facility-based firm in the upstream segment. 
Throughout we make the following assumption 
                                                                 
21 See e.g. discussion by Shapiro and Varian (1998). 
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Assumption 1:  p p2 10 0 0³ ³ ³ ³, , ,w c x  
The first two constraints state that each firm should have a non-negative profit. The third term 
says that the vertically integrated firm must have a non-negative price cost margin on its sale 
to the independent firm in the retail segment. The last term states that the investment must be 
non-negative. 
Welfare 
The welfare function: 
W CS= + +p p1 2  
 
A benchmark 
 
Let us consider a market context in absence of the investment in quality improvement (x=0). 
In an unregulated market the facility-based firm chooses the access price in the upstream 
market at stage 1. In a regulated market the regulator chooses the access price at stage 1. At 
stage 2 the firms compete à la Cournot.  In this context the results can be summarised in the 
following lemma:    
Lemma 1: If the vertically integrated firm does not invest in quality improvement (x=0), the 
regulator sets the access price equal to marginal cost. If the access price is unregulated, the 
vertically integrated firm sets an access price that forecloses the rival from the market. The 
consumer surplus and total welfare level are higher under the access regulation regime 
compared to the unregulated regime.   
2.1 Retail market competition 
We solve the model by backward induction and assume Cournot competition between the two 
firms (the ISPs) in the retail market for broadband Internet connectivity.  
Equilibrium quantities in the competitive segment are: 
q a c w c x1 1 22 3
* [( ) ( ) ( )] /= - + - + -b b   
q a c w c x2 2 12 2 3
* [( ) ( ) ( )] /= - - - + -b b  
  12 
Until otherwise stated, we make the following assumption: 
 
Assumption 2: 2 0 12b bi j where i j i j- ³ = ¹, , ,  
 
Assumption 2 ensures that the difference in ability to offer value-added services between the 
retail firms is not too high. When 2 01 2b b- ³ , the rival’s quantity is non-decreasing by the 
investment in x for given access price w. Hence, the vertically integrated firm cannot use the 
investment as an alternative foreclosure under access price regulation. In section 2.5 we 
modify this assumption and assume 2 02 1b b- < . Then the vertically integrated firm may use 
overinvestment as an alternative foreclosure tool under access price regulation.  
2.2 Unregulated access price  
The vertically integrated firm sets the access price at stage 1, and stage 2 is as above.   
2.2.1 Stage 1:  
The objective function for the facility-based firm at stage 1 is:  
p j1 1
2
2
2 2= + - -q w c q x( ) /  
The first order condition with respect to w gives the equilibrium access price at stage 1: 
w a c x* ( ) / ( ) /= + + +2 4 102 1b b  
If we insert for w* into the equilibrium quantities, we have the following: 
q a c x1 1 25 7 2 10
* [ ( ) ( )] /= - + -b b  
q x2 2 12 5
* ( )] /= -b b  
Q a c x* [ ( ) ( )] /= - + +5 3 2 101 2b b  
Proposition 1: Let us assume no regulation of the access price. The condition b b2 1>  is 
necessary and sufficient to ensure that the downstream rival is active in the market.  
From Lemma 1 we know that in absence of the investment (x=0) the independent firm is 
foreclosed from the market. In contrast, we see that under investment in quality improvement 
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(x>0) the independent retail firm will be active in the market if it has higher ability to use the 
improved input quality such that b b2 1> . 
2.2.2 Stage 0: 
 
Foreclosure: 
From Proposition 1 it follows that as long as b b1 2³ , the vertically integrated firm will use 
the access price in the next stage to practice foreclosure towards the rival (firm 2). Hence, in 
the case where it is optimal to practice foreclosure it chooses the investment level as a 
downstream monopoly. Downstream monopoly quantity is q a c xm
* . [ ]= - +05 1b , and the 
objective function for the facility-based firm when it sets x as a downstream monopolist is 
p j1
2 205m mq x= -( ) . . Superscript m indicates downstream monopoly.  
The first order condition with respect to x gives the following investment level: 
¶
¶
= Þ = - = -
p
b j b1 1 1
20 2
x
x a c A where Am m m
* * *( ) /  
The second order condition is fulfilled as long as Am
* >0.22 Inserting for xm
*  gives the 
following equilibrium quantity:  
q
a c
m
* ( )=
-
-
j
j b2 1
2  
Market sharing: 
From Proposition 1 we know that both retail firms are active as long as b b2 1> . The 
objective function for the facility-based firm when it sets x is:  
max ( ) ( ) .
x
q w c q xp j1 1
2
2
20 5= + - -  
 
We insert for w* , *1q  and 
*
2q . Then the first order condition with respect to x gives the 
following investment level: 
                                                                 
22 At the investment stage (stage 0) the second order condition ensures that the cost parameter j  is sufficiently 
high, such that the investing firm will not make an infinite investment in quality improvement.  
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¶
¶
= Þ = -
p
b1 10 5x
x a c A* *( ) / where A* = - + -10 9 8 41
2
1 2 2
2j b b b b  
The second order condition is fulfilled as long as A* > 0 . Comparing the investment level 
under foreclosure (i.e. b b1 2³ ) with the market sharing equilibrium (b b2 1> ), we find the 
following (see appendix): 
Lemma 2: Let us assume no regulation of the access price. For a given level of b1  the 
investment will be higher under market sharing (i.e. b b2 1> ) than under foreclosure, (i.e. 
b b1 2³ )  as long as the second order conditions are fulfilled. Moreover, the investment and 
the rival’s quantity increase with the rival’s ability to use the quality improvement when 
b b2 1>  , i.e. that dx d
* / b 2 0>  and dq d2 2 0
* / b >  .  
Without access price regulation, the vertically integrated firm may imitate the strategy in the 
foreclosure case in the market sharing case as well. Hence, when the vertically integrated firm 
chooses to serve the rival, this means that the profit by doing so is higher than the monopoly 
outcome. When the rival is more efficient in using the improved quality of local 
access, b b2 1> , the consumers have higher willingness to pay for the service from ISP 2 than 
that from ISP 1. Hence, it will be optimal to let the rival be active in the market in order to 
capture some of the rent from ISP 2. The access price will, however, be set such that the 
quantity offered by ISP 2 will be low in order to dampen the competition. Inserting for 
x* gives the following total quantity: 
[ ]222121** 2535 bbbbj -+--= A
ca
Q  
The reason why the vertically integrated firm does not outsource the retail market to the more 
efficient rival is the assumption of a linear access price. In contrast, if the vertically integrated 
firm can use a two-part tariff for access, it will set a unit access price equal to the marginal 
cost c, and then capture the monopoly profit of the more efficient rival (ISP 2) through the 
fixed fee. In other words, if the network owner offers the two-part tariff 222 )( cqqT
m += p , the 
retail rival (ISP 2) makes no profit, and the upstream monopolist will achieve the same 
outcome as if ISP 2 were its own subsidiary (see e.g. Rey and Tirole, 1997). In the present 
paper we use the linear price assumption since this seems to be the business model the 
majority of the telecommunications incumbents use in their wholesale service for broadband 
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(see discussion by Petkovic and De Coster, 2000). So why is that the network owners do not 
outsource their retail activity through non- linear pricing? First, it may be due to economies of 
scope such that 21 bb > . Second, outsourcing the retail market activity may imply that the 
network owner does not retain the bargaining power needed to offer such a take- it-or-leave- it 
offer to the retail monopolist (ISP2). Third, if the wholesale segment is regulated, while the 
retail segment is not (see also footnote 24 below), the network owner may not want to 
outsource the unregulated activity.  
2.3 Access price regulation  
The government may regulate w to maximise welfare. In principle, the regulator can act as a 
first-mover and set w before the facility-based firm sets x. Such a commitment to ex ante 
regulation may, however, not be credible. We assume that the regulator has no ability to 
regulate the access price ex ante of the investment, and, hence, the only difference in the game 
from the complete unregulated regime is that the regulator decides the access price at stage 1 
instead of the vertically integrated firm.  
2.3.1 Stage 1: 
The welfare function may be written as 
2
)(
2
)( 2
2
2
1
2
2
2
21 xqcwqq
qq
W
j
--+++
+
=  
The first term is the consumer surplus. The second term is the profit by the independent firm. 
The last three terms are the vertically integrated firm’s profit.  
The regulator sets the access price w after the investment in x has taken place. The first order 
condition with respect to w gives the regulated access price margin:23  
w c a c x- = - - + -( ) ( )4 51 2b b  
When (w – c) <0, it is a violation of the constraint that w c³ . Then we have the following 
result (given the assumption that w c³ ):  
                                                                 
23 The second order condition is fulfilled. 
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Proposition 2: Let us assume regulation of the access price. A necessary and sufficient 
condition to ensure that it is optimal for the regulator to set access price equal to marginal 
cost, ( wr = c), is - - + - <( ) ( )a c x 4 5 01 2b b . 
In this section we assume that the necessary and sufficient condition in Proposition 2 is 
fulfilled, such that optimal regulated access price will be set to marginal cost ( wr = c) at stage 
1. Superscript r indicates regulated access price.24  
Inserting for w=c into the equilibrium quantities from stage 2 gives: 
q a c xr1 1 22 3= - + -[( ) ( )] /b b    
q a c xr2 2 12 3= - + -[( ) ( )] /b b  
Q a c xr = - + +[ ( ) ( )] /2 31 2b b  
2.3.2 Stage 0: 
Now the facility-based firm has no revenue from the upstream market, and the objective 
function for the facility-based firm is:  
max ( ) ( )] / .
x
a c x xp b b j1 1 2
2 22 3 0 5= - + - -  
The first order condition with respect to x gives the following investment level: 
¶
¶
= Þ = - - = - -
p
b b j b b1 1 2 1 2
20 2 2 9 2 2
x
x a c A where Ar r r( )( ) / ( )  
Inserting for x r  into Qr  gives: 
Q
a c
A
r
r=
-
+ - -
( )
( ( )( )6 2 2 1 2 2 1j b b b b ) 
                                                                 
24 Note that if the regulator were allowed to set the access price below the marginal cost (w<c), it would have 
done that in order to correct for the imperfect competition in the retail market. If the regulator may use a two-part 
tariff, it could set w<c, and still ensure through the fixed fee that the upstream unit of the integrated firm has 
non-negative profit. In this case, the regulator could use a unit-price w below marginal cost c in order to correct 
for the imperfect competition in the retail market.  
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From Lemma 2 we know that under market sharing in the unregulated case the investment 
level increases when b 2  increases.  In contrast to the unregula ted case, we now see that the 
investment level decreases in the rival’s ability to offer value-added services as the input 
quality is improved, since dx dr / b2 0< (see proof of Proposition 3 in appendix). Since the 
facility-based firm has no revenue from its upstream sale, it sees the advantage of the non-
facility-based firm from the investment as a pure spillover. The higher the non-facility based 
firm’s ability to use the investment, the higher the spillover from the investment to the rival. 
Not surprisingly, the higher the spillover, the lower the incentives to make an investment.  
Moreover, from Lemma 2 we know that without regulation the rival’s quantity increases with 
b 2 under market sharing. Under access price regulation we find that:   
( ) 3/)2)(/(2/ 12222 bbbb -+= ddxxddq rr  
The first term is positive and indicates that for a given investment level, the rival’s quantity 
increases when b 2 increases. The second term indicates that an increase in b 2 will have an 
effect on the investment level and that this in turn will affect the quantity offered by the rival. 
We know that dx dr / b2 0< and in this section we assume that ( )2 02 1b b- > . Hence, the 
second term is negative. This is due to the fact that for the vertically integrated firm the 
parameter b 2  is now seen as a pure spillover, which reduces the investment incentives. And 
therefore, when the spillover increases, the incentives to invest will be reduced. The total 
effect on the rival’s quantity is then ambiguous.  
Related to the quantity offered by the vertically integrated firm’s retailer, we have that the 
higher the spillover, the lower the retail quantity sold from the facility-based firm (such that 
dq dr1 2 0/ b < ). There are two effects leading to this result. First, the higher the spillover is, 
the lower is the investment. When the investment is reduced, the facility-based firm lowers its 
retail quantity. Second, since the quantities offered by the two rivals are strategic substitutes, 
the facility-based firm reacts to an increase in the quantity from the rival by reducing its own 
quantity (Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer, 1985). The second effect may be positive or 
negative (see above), but the total effect on the vertically integrated firm’s quantity from an 
increase in b 2  is negative. 
  18 
2.4 Comparison of results with and without access price regulation 
The motivation behind an access price regulation is to prevent foreclosure and increase 
competition such that welfare increases. Industry profit will be higher without regulation than 
with regulation. Hence, a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to intervene with an access 
price regulation is that the consumer surplus increases compared to the case without 
regulation. In order to compare the levels of consumer surplus with and without regulation we 
must make a distinction between the case of foreclosure and the case of market sharing in the 
unregulated market.  
Foreclosure without regulation: 
For simplicity we now make the following assumption: 
b b2 1 1£ º  
In the access price regulation equilibrium, the vertically integrated firm has no profit from the 
input segment. From assumption 2 we have that b2 0 5³ . . Moreover, we assume that the cost 
parameter j  is so high that the second order conditions are fulfilled, i.e. j >j crit =0.5 in this 
case. 
We have the following results for investment and consumer surplus with and without 
regulation (see appendix):  
Proposition 3: In the case where b b2 1 1£ º  we have the following results regarding 
investment and consumer surplus: 
i. the investment level is lower with than without access price regulation, i.e. that 
x xr m- <
* 0 . 
ii. the consumer surplus is lower with than without regulation as long as the investment 
cost is not too convex ( such that q q qr r m1 2+ <
*  ). 
 
Hence, the parameter j  must be above a critical value to ensure that regulation improves 
consumer surplus. Similarly, since industry profit is lower with than without regulation, we 
find that the total welfare is lower with than without regulation when the investment cost is 
not too convex. The critical value of j  that ensures that access price regulation improves 
  19 
welfare is higher than the critical value of j  that ensures that regulation increases consumer 
surplus.  
In this case the vertically integrated firm has higher ability to transform input into output than 
the rival. Then, if it is allowed to do so, it will prevent the rival from entering the market 
through the access price. In order to ensure entry the regulator may then impose an access 
price regulation that prevents the vertically integrated firm from practising foreclosure. The 
regulator faces a classic trade-off between triggering competition and dampening investment 
incentives.   Moreover, this trade-off implies that it may be better if the rival has significantly 
lower ability to offer value-added services than the vertically integrated firm since this will 
reduce the spillover from the investment. Put differently, the closer b 2  is to b1 , the higher j  
has to be to ensure that the consumer surplus is higher with than without regulation. Thus we 
have: 
Corollary 1: In the case where 0.5<b b2 1 1£ º , a lower b 2  makes it more likely that 
consumer surplus is higher with than without access price regulation. 
This gives rise to a paradox. It is more likely that it is optimal for the regulator to ensure entry 
by access price regulation if firm 2 has low ability to offer value-added services compared to 
the vertically integrated firm. Usually, we see that the potential entrants are arguing in the 
opposite direction. They argue that the regulator should encourage entry since they have at 
least the same ability to offer value-added services as the incumbent. Put differently, in the 
present model it may be better for the regulator to allow for an inefficient entrant than having 
an efficient retail monopoly.  
 
Market sharing without regulation: 
Both firms are active in the market also in the market equilibrium, and we make the following 
assumption: 
121 º< bb  
We compare the results with and without regulation when the rival has the highest ability to 
transform the input to output, and we still assume that j >j crit =0.5. Then we have the 
following results (see appendix): 
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Proposition 4: In the case where 121 º< bb  we have the following results regarding 
investment and consumer surplus: 
i. the investment level is lower with than without access price regulation, i.e. that 
x xr - <* 0 . 
ii. the consumer surplus  is lower with than without regulation as long as the investment 
cost is not too convex (such that q q q qr r1 2 1 2+ < +
* * ) . 
As in the previous case total welfare is also lower with than without regulation when the 
investment cost is not too convex.  
For b1close to 0.5 the welfare loss from dampened competition in the case without access 
price regulation will be high. The loss from dampened competition, for a given investment 
level, in the unregulated regime may be separated into two effects. First, there will be a loss 
due to the fact that total quantity is reduced when the rival pays an access price higher than 
the marginal cost. This loss is higher the lower b1  is compared to b 2 (which is equal to one). 
Second, there will be a loss due to the fact that the less effective firm 1 will serve most of the 
market. For a given investment level, these two competition effects will imply that the 
consumer surplus and total welfare may be enhanced by access price regulation. However, 
access price regulation will reduce the investment incentives of the vertically integrated firm. 
For b1=0.5 the investment is zero. However, for b1close to 0.5 the pro-competitive effects of 
regulation dominate the negative investment incentives effect even if the cost parameter j  is 
low.  As in the previous case (Corollary 1) it is more likely that the consumer surplus is 
higher under access price regulation compared to the case without regulation if the difference 
between the firms’ ability to offer value-added services is large.  
 
2.5 Access price regulation and non-price foreclosure 
In this section we analyse whether the vertically integrated firm may have incentives to 
overinvest as an alternative foreclosure tool when assumption 2 is altered. Until now we have 
assumed that the rival firm’s quantity increases when the investment increases for a given 
access price (assumption 2). In contrast, we now assume that 2 02 1b b- < , such that the rival 
will reduce its quantity when the investment increases for a given access price (since 
dq dx2 0
* / <  in stage 2). For simplicity, we make the following assumption: 
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Assumption 3: b b1 21 2 0º > >  
At stage 0 the vertically integrated firm sets x, and at stage 1 the vertically integrated firm or 
the regulator sets the access price. We know that for low values of b 2 , it may be optimal for 
the regulator to set the access price above marginal cost (see above). For the sake of 
simplicity, we assume that the optimal regulated access price at stage 1 is w c³ . At stage 2 
the firms compete à la Cournot when both firms are active in the market. The strategic 
investment game has the timing structure analysed by Dixit (1980).  
The stage 2 quantities given that w c³  are q a c w x1 22 2 3
* ( ( )) /= - + + - b  and 
q a c w x2 22 2 1 3
* ( ( )) /= + - + -b . We analyse whether the vertically integrated firm (the first-
mover) chooses to invest to foreclose the rival (deterrence of entry) or to share the market 
with the rival (accommodation of entry).  
 
Blockaded entry  
The monopoly investment given assumption 3 is x a cm
* ( ) / ( )= - -2 1j  . If we insert xm
*  into 
q2
*  we find that entry is blockaded with the monopoly investment when 
)/()12)(()1)((2 cacwca
c ---+--£º jjbb .  The question is whether the vertically 
integrated firm will overinvest in x when b bc < £2 05. .  
Entry deterrence through non-price foreclosure: 
The effect of the investment x on the rival’s profit is 
3/)12(2)3/)2)((( 222222
2 -=--+= bbb
p
qqq
dx
d
 
The first term is the direct effect of x on the rival’s profit, and it is positive. The second term 
is the strategic effect, which will be negative. An increase in x increases the second stage 
choice of q1 . Since the quantities offered by the two firms are strategic substitutes, an 
increase in q1  will lower the profit margin for ISP 2.  
When assumption 3 is met (2 12b - <0), the strategic effect dominates the direct effect. To 
foreclose the rival the vertically integrated firm should overinvest such that q f2 0=  
(superscript f indicates foreclosure by overinvestment): 
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q x
a w cf f
2
2
0
2
2 1
= Þ =
- + -
-b
 
For x=0 we assume that both firms are active in the market, such that a w c- + >2 0 . Then it 
follows that for b 2 < 0.5: 
dx
dw
f
=
-
<
2
2 1
0
2b
 
and  
dx
d
a w cf
b b2 2
2
2 2
2 1
0=
- - + -
-
>
( )
( )
 
For a lower local access price, the vertically integrated firm’s response is to increase the 
investment if it wants to deter entry. The higher b 2  (but lower than 0.5), the higher the 
investment must be to enhance a given reduction in the rival’s quantity.   
When the rival is foreclosed, the vertically integrated firm sets the monopoly quantity in stage 
2. Inserting for x f  we find that q a c w cf1 2 21 2 1= - - + - -[( )( ) ( )] / ( )b b . For b 2 < 0.5 we 
see that: 
dq
dw
f
1
2
1
2 1
0=
-
<
b
 
Hence, a restrictive access price regulation may be effective even if no inputs are sold to the 
rival. When the access price increases, the vertically integrated firm must overinvest less 
compared to the monopoly investment level. If we insert for investment level and quantity 
offered by the vertically integrated firm, we find the profit and the welfare functions under 
foreclosure: 
p j1 1
2 205f f fq x= -( ) . ( )  
W qf f f= +p1 1
205. ( )  
Now it can be shown that:  
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dW
dw
a c w cf
=
- - + + - -
-
( )( ) ( )( )
( )
3 3 2 3 4
2 1
2
2
2
b j j
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When this is negative, we see that an access price regulation may be effective even if the rival 
is still foreclosed from the market. The reason is that an access price regulation forces the 
vertically integrated firm to increase the investment if it wants to foreclose the rival. The 
investment is an investment in quality, and we know that a monopolist may have too high or 
too low incentives to offer quality seen from the social planner’s point of view (Spence, 
1975).  
We now check that in this particular setting the monopolist offers too low quality 
(investment) seen from the regulator’s point of view. Given entry deterrence, we have non-
price foreclosure such that q qf2 2 0= =
* . The vertically integrated firm chooses the monopoly 
quantity in stage 2, i.e. q a c xm1 2= - +( ) / . As long as q2 0= ,  the welfare level will be given 
by W q x= -( ) /3 21
2 2j . Thus we have dW dx q dq dx x/ ( ( / ) )= -3 1 1 j . We know that without 
access price regulation x a cm
* ( ) / ( )= - -2 1j . Inserting for xm
*  we find that 
dW dx a c
x xm
/ ( ) / ( ( ))*= = - - >j j2 2 1 0 . 
Even if q qf2 2 0= =
* , the welfare will increase if the regulator through a binding access price 
regulation gives the vertically integrated firm an incentive to increase the investment 
compared to xm
* .  
Proposition 5: Let us assume that b b1 21 2 0º > > and that there is a binding access price 
regulation. Then we have the following results: 
i. The vertically integrated firm overinvests compared to the monopoly equilibrium 
without access price regulation, i.e. x xf m- >
* 0 . 
ii. When the unconstrained monopoly underinvests seen from the regulator’s point of 
view, access price regulation increases welfare since it forces the vertically integrated 
firm to invest more.  
iii. If the rival has a low ability to offer value-added services compared to the vertically 
integrated firm, the rival will be foreclosed from the market both with and without 
access price regulation, i.e. q qf2 2 0= =
* . 
If the vertically integrated firm chooses not to foreclose the rival (accommodation of entry) it 
will set x to maximise its own profit. We interpret b c as the critical value for whether 
foreclosure is optimal or not. Hence we have three intervals analogous to Dixit (1980):  
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i. Blockaded entry whenb b2 £
c : The rival is blocked from entry by the monopoly 
investment level xm
* .  
ii. Deterrence of entry whenb b bc c< < <2 05. : The vertically integrated firm 
overinvests to foreclose the rival. 
iii. Accommodation of entry when 0 5 2. > ³b b
c : Then it is more profitable for the 
vertically integrated firm to set x that maximises it’s own profit, even if the rival is 
active in the market.  
We see that the outcome may be foreclosure even if the access price is regulated. This is in 
contrast to the previous sections where both firms were active in the market under access 
price regulation. Note that the main difference from the previous case is that b b1 22> .  The 
literature on non-price foreclosure typically focuses on the detrimental impact on welfare 
when an access price regulation gives incentives to extend the untapped market power by 
non-price methods. In contrast, in our context, it may increase welfare.  
3 Some concluding remarks 
In this paper we have analysed a market structure where a vertically integrated firm controls 
an essential input for retail providers of Internet connectivity. The vertically integrated firm 
may undertake an investment that increases the quality of the input (upgrading to broadband). 
In an unregulated retail market the vertically integrated firm competes with an independent 
firm that buys access as an input. We analyse the effect of an access price regulation that is 
imposed on the vertically integrated firm. Since an upgrade of the local access network to 
broadband is an irreversible investment, we assume that the regulator has limited commitment 
ability with respect to the access price. Hence, the access price is set after the investment, but 
before retail competition.  
We compare the access price regulation regime with the outcome without regulation. The 
total effect on consumer surplus and welfare critically depends on whether the vertically 
integrated firm has higher ability to offer value-added services (broadband services) than the 
rival firm. If the retailers do not differ too much with respect to their ability to offer value-
added services, when the input is improved, we show that access price regulation reduces the 
vertically integrated firm’s investment incentives. Furthermore, an access price regulation 
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lowers consumer surplus and total welfare as long as the cost of investment is not too convex. 
In contrast, if the vertically integrated firm’s ability to offer value-added services is much 
higher than that of the independent rival, an increase in the investment level will reduce the 
quantity offered by the independent retailer. The vertically integrated firm may then use 
overinvestment as an alternative tool to drive the rival out of the market.  
In our model the regulated access price will be set equal to or close to the marginal cost. 
Hence, compared to the case without access price regulation the regulator removes most of 
the vertically integrated firm’s cost advantage in the retail market. If the retailers’ ability to 
offer value-added services is quite similar, then the independent firm will have higher profit 
than the facility-based firm since the latter has to cover the investment costs. Put differently, 
the access price regulation may imply a second-mover advantage. In the present paper we 
have not focused on entry, but this feature of the regulation will probably discourage facility-
based entry. In particular this will be true if we incorporate uncertainty in the analysis. The 
non-facility-based firm may enter the market later, and, furthermore, does not need to make 
the irreversible investment.  
The timing structure seems to correspond to the current regulatory paradigm both in the EU 
and the USA. This paradigm mandates that the access price should be set to the long-run 
incremental costs (LRIC).  At first glance, this may include the investments in e.g. broadband 
upgrades, while we show that the regulator will set the access price equal to the marginal cost 
as long as the retailers do not differ too much in their ability to offer value-added services. 
The main feature is, however, that the determination of the long-run incremental costs is 
highly discretionary and that the decision is taken after the investment is made. Hence, its 
impact on incentives to invest before the discretionary decision on the access price will be 
analogous to the case analysed in the present paper. Hausman (1997) argues that FCC’s 
measure of LRIC ignores the existence of technological progress that is reducing the prices 
and increasing the quality of the components in a broadband access network. Hence, LRIC 
implies an access price corresponding to the most efficient components available at the time 
the access price is set, and this will not cover the investment costs under a rapidly changing 
technology. Uncertainty is not formerly analysed in the present model, but there is obviously 
a significant probability of failure when a firm invests in a broadband access network, and this 
will make the problem of investment incentives even more important. The current LRIC 
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approach does not cover the costs of unsuccessful services.25 Cave and Prosperetti (2001) 
focus on the situation in the EU, and they argue that the incumbents do not have sufficient 
incentives to upgrade to broadband access, since they anticipate that they will be forced to 
offer access at cost-based prices. 
If there was no ability to improve the network quality through the investment, a regulated 
access price close to or equal to marginal costs will improve welfare compared to the case 
without an access price regulation. This indicates that the current regulation regime in EU and 
the USA may be better than no regulation if static efficiency was the only goal for the 
regulator. In contrast, when there is an investment decision before the access price regulation 
is decided, the benchmark without access price regulation may imply higher welfare, but the 
conclusion is ambiguous.  Obviously, the regulator may alter the outcome by non- linear 
wholesale prices, price regulation in the retail market, and line-of business restrictions, but the 
basic challenge seems to be the choice of rules versus discretion in the governments’ policy. 
When the policymaker has the opportunity to set the access price discretionary after the 
investment, it will set the access price close to marginal cost (or LRIC). When the decision is 
taken after the investment, this is the best thing to do for the regulator, given the current 
situation. It is not a result of non-optimal behaviour from the regulator. If the regulator wishes 
to realise the outcome in the case without access price regulation, it has to credibly commit to 
a policy rule before the investment that prevents the regulator from using the discretionary 
access price regulation. 26   
 
                                                                 
25 See Hausman (1997) for further discussion on these issues.  
26 The classic paper on time inconsistency and rules versus discretion is Kydland and Prescott (1977).  
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Appendix  
Proof of Lemma 2:  
 
A necessary and sufficient condition for market sharing is now that b b2 1> . 
 
x x a c A Am m
* * * *[ ( ) ( ) ] / ( )- = - - >4 01 2 1
2b b b  
 
dx d a c A if* */ ( ) ( ) / ( )b b b b b b2 1 2 1
2
2 140 0= - - > >  
 
dq d if2 2 2 10
* / b b b> > .QED. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: 
The higher ability the non-facility-based firm has to use the investment, the lower is the 
investment level with access price regulation: 
 
dx
d
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The higher ability the non-facility-based firm has to use the investment, the lower is the 
consumer surplus with access price regulation: 
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i. We have dx dr / b2 0< . Hence, it is sufficient to ensure x x
r
m- <
* 0 for b 2 0 5= . . For 
b 2 0 5= . we have that x x a c A
r
m m- = - - <
* *( ) / .3 0   
ii. We have that dQ dr / b2 0<  for b 2 0 5 1Î[ . , ]  . Hence, let us insert for b 2 0 5= . . Then 
we have Q q a c A Ar m
r
m- = - - +
* *( ) . . /3 4 5 152j j  which is negative for j jcrit < < 1  
and positive for j > 1.QED 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 4:  
i. x x a c A A A Ar r r- = - - -* * *( )[ ( ) ] /2 2 1 51 1b b . Hence to check x x
r - ³* 0  we see 
whether [ ( ) ]*2 2 1 5 01 1b b- - ³A A
r . This requires that j b b£ - +2 2 3 1 51
2
1( ) /  which 
will never be fulfilled for b j j1 051 05Î > =[ . , ] .and
crit .  
ii. Q Q a c A A A Ar r r- = - + - - - - + -* * *( ) ( ( )( )) (5 ) /6 2 2 1 1 3 5 21 1 1
2
1j b b j b b . Let us 
check whether A Ar*( ( )( )) (5 )6 2 2 1 1 3 5 2 01 1 1
2
1j b b j b b+ - - - - + - ³ . When 
solving the inequality with respect to j  we find that: j b b³ - +13 1 13 1 2( ( ) ) . 
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Moreover we see that the restriction on j  to ensure Q Qr - ³* 0  is stronger for higher 
b1  since
¶
¶ >
j
b1
0  for b1 0 5 1Î[ . , ] QED. 
